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Jones v. Harris Associates:
Shareholders’ Consolation Prize
in the Mutual Fund Fee Debate
Nicole Grospe*
I.

Introduction

Mutual funds have become one of the most popular
investment vehicles for Americans today.1 The mutual fund
industry manages assets for more than ninety million
Americans.2 Unfortunately, these shareholders are feeling the
detrimental effects of the structure of mutual funds and their
fees. One of the biggest issues in the mutual fund industry is
the risk of excessive fees. Many difficulties arise because of the
relationship between a mutual fund‟s adviser and its board of
directors, where both are essentially in positions to bite the
hand that feeds them. The adviser not only manages the fund
but also chooses the board. The “captive” board in turn
determines the adviser‟s compensation. As a result, the
relationships of these captive funds often lead to excessive fees.
Congress has attempted to prevent this dilemma by passing
the Investment Company Act of 1940. In particular, Section
36(b) provides that advisers and boards have a fiduciary duty
to shareholders in charging reasonable fees.3
The mutual fund industry and its shareholders have since

* J.D., Pace University School of Law, 2011; B.S., Cornell University,
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 2007. The Author would like to
thank Professor Edward Pekarek for his guidance and the staff of Pace Law
Review for their efforts.
1. Caroline J. Dillon, Do You Get What You Pay for? A Look at the High
Fees and Low Protections of Mutual Funds, 2006 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 281,
282.
2. John P. Freeman et. al., Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence
and A Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 Okla. L. Rev. 83 (2008).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2000).
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been impacted by judicial review and interpretation of the
Section 36(b) fiduciary duty standard. The longstanding
approach, established by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.,4 held
mutual fund fees to be excessive if the fees charged were “so
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable
relationship to the services rendered and could not have been
the product of arm‟s-length bargaining.”5 While the standard
did not foreclose investor lawsuits against funds, no plaintiff
investor has ever won a lawsuit under Gartenberg. In Jones v.
Harris Associates,6 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
turned this standard of Section 36(b) on its head, rejecting the
Gartenberg opinion and advocating for an approach that would
make it even more difficult for investors to bring suit for
excessive mutual fund adviser compensation. The United
States Supreme Court, in its March 30, 2010 opinion, overruled
the Seventh Circuit decision and affirmed the Gartenberg
standard.
This Note provides a critique of the Supreme Court
decision in Jones. First, this Note offers an overview of the
structure of mutual funds and their fees, as well as a
background of a mutual fund‟s fiduciary duty under Section
36(b) of the Investment Company Act. Next, it contrasts the
standard of Section 36(b) established in Gartenberg with the
standard announced by the Seventh Circuit in Jones. Finally,
this Note analyzes the Supreme Court‟s decision to affirm the
Gartenberg standard and ultimately argues that the Court
should have done more to protect the interests of shareholders.

4. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d
at 632 (7th Cir. 2008) vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
5. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d
Cir. 1982).
6. Jones, 527 F.3d 627.
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II. Mutual Funds: Structure and Fees
A. Structure
Mutual funds are open-ended funds7 operated by
investment companies that pool money from shareholders and
invest it in stocks, bonds, and other financial securities.8 The
organization of a mutual fund involves an investment adviser,
an underwriter of the fund‟s shares, and a custodian.9 This
Note focuses on the investment adviser. “The investment
adviser is a professional money-manager, independent of, but
tightly connected to, the mutual fund.”10 Typically, the
investment adviser is an investment company that provides
one or more mutual funds with investment services.11 The
adviser is responsible for investing the fund‟s assets and
handling the day-to-day management of the fund, such as
procuring staff, office-space, and overseeing administrative
staff.12 The adviser also establishes and controls the fund‟s
board of directors. Legal requirements mandate the mutual
fund boards be populated by independent directors.13 Advisers‟
employees often obtain seats on the board as a result of the
adviser‟s ultimate control.14
The adviser often organizes the fund‟s board with directors
who have business or personal connections to the adviser or its
executives.15 The relationship between the adviser and the
7. An open-end fund is one that has no restrictions on the amount of
shares that it will issue and buys back its shares at current asset value.
BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 1045 (8th ed. 2004).
8. U.S.
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm‟n,
Mutual
Fund,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/tools/mfcc/mutual-fund-help.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2011).
9. William P. Rogers & James N. Benedict, Money Market Fund
Management Fees: How Much is Too Much?, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1063
(1982).
10. Emily D. Johnson, The Fiduciary Duty in Mutual Fund Excessive Fee
Cases: Ripe for Reexamination, 59 DUKE L.J. 145, 152 (2009).
11. Dillon, supra note 1, at 284.
12. Id. at 283-84.
13. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-10 (West 2010).
14. See Dillon, supra note 1, at 284.
15. John M. Greabe et al., Moving Beyond Gartenberg: A Process-Based
and Comparative Approach to Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of
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fund is crucial. “The Second Circuit, in [Gartenberg v. Merrill
Lynch], described the board‟s relationship with its fund as
virtually „unseverable.‟”16 Because of the close relationship
between advisers and mutual funds, mutual funds are often
called captives of their advisers.17 “Because of this „unseverable‟
relationship, the fund is usually limited to buying advisory
services from a single provider.”18
B. Mutual Fund Fees
The structure of mutual funds can have a problematic
effect on advisory fees charged to mutual fund investors.19
“Fees, which compensate advisers for portfolio management,
are negotiated annually between the adviser and its captive
fund‟s board.”20 Because the adviser and the board negotiate
the fees, the negotiations are rarely at arm‟s length. “Not
surprisingly, advisers typically do not negotiate fee agreements
by vying against each other to land advisory contracts from
mutual funds that are already up and operating. Rather, they
create their own mutual fund „clients‟ by forming, marketing,
and managing the funds they advise.”21 The compensation is an
advisory fee paid out of the assets of a fund. As a result, this
may lead to the possibility of a windfall to the adviser. “When
fund assets, and thus advisory fees, swell over time, but the
advisor does not institute appropriate concomitant fee
decreases (called „breakpoints‟) to account for diminishing
marginal management costs, the adviser pockets these huge
sums.”22

1940, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 133, 136 (2008).
16. Freeman et al., supra note 2, at 84.
17. Dillon, supra note 1, at 284.
18. Freeman et al., supra note 2, at 84.
19. Greabe et al., supra note 15, at 138
20. Freeman et al., supra note 2, at 84.
21. Greabe et al., supra note 15, at 136.
22. Id. at 183.
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III. Regulating Mutual Funds: Advisers‟ Fiduciary Duty
The relationship between the adviser and board of a
mutual fund can have a detrimental effect on shareholders.
The adviser wants fees as high as possible, but the board is
responsible, as the shareholders‟ agent, for negotiating the best
deal possible for shareholders.23 Of course, the board, which
often consists of the adviser‟s business contacts, employees, and
others who are partial to the adviser, does not always act on
behalf of the shareholders‟ best interests.24
In 1940, Congress enacted the Investment Company Act
“as a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme to protect
investment company shareholders from self-dealing and other
abuses that were perceived to be rampant throughout the
mutual fund industry.”25 “As mutual funds experienced rapid
growth in the 1950s and 1960s, investment advisers earned
fees which did not necessarily reflect perceived economies of
scale realized in managing larger funds.”26 The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) authorized the Wharton School of
Finance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania to
study the mutual fund industry in the wake of this sudden
growth.27 The Wharton Report found that investment advisers
charged “relatively high rates,” which competitive market
forces did not reduce because of the close association between
the advisers and the fund.28 In addition, the report indicated
that advisers charged substantially higher fees to mutual fund
investors than those to institutional investors.29
In response to the SEC report, Congress added Section
36(b) to the Investment Company Act in 1970.30 Section 36(b)

23. Dillon, supra note 1, at 287.
24. Id.
25. James N. Benedict et al., Recent Developments in Litigation Under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, SM086 A.L.I. - A.B.A. 391, 405 (2007).
26. Id. at 406.
27. WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS,
H.R. REP. NO. 87-2274, at 28 (1962).
28. Id. at 29.
29. Id.
30. See Daily Income Fund, Inc., et al. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 537-38
(1984).
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established a fiduciary duty “with respect to the receipt of
compensation for services” between the investment advisor and
the shareholders.31 Section 36(b) also expressly provides a right
of action for private citizens:
An action may be brought under this subsection
by the Commission, or by a security holder of
such registered investment company on behalf of
such company, against such investment adviser,
or any affiliated person of such investment
adviser, or any other person enumerated in
subsection (a) of this section who has a fiduciary
duty concerning such compensation or payments,
for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such
compensation or payments paid by such
registered investment company or by the security
holders thereof to such investment adviser or
person.32
IV. Section 36(b) Standard
A. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.
The key case that has set the standard for interpreting and
applying Section 36(b) is Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset
Management, Inc.,33 a mutual fund excessive fee case decided
in 1982.34 In Gartenberg, plaintiff shareholders held shares in
the money market fund35 “Merrill Lynch‟s Ready Asset
Trust.”36 They claimed that the fund “realized cost savings
through economies of scale, but was not passing the savings on

31. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-35(b)(2) (West 2010).
32. Id. § 80a-35(b).
33. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
34. Id.
35. “A money market fund is a type of mutual fund that is required by
law to invest in low-risk securities.” U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‟n, Money
Market Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfmmkt.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2011).
36. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 925.
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to shareholders through lower fees.”37 Thus, plaintiffs alleged
that the compensation paid by the fund to investment adviser,
Merrill Lynch, was excessive and constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty in violation of Section 36(b) of the Investment
Company Act.38 The district court entered judgment dismissing
the plaintiff‟s case and found that the compensation paid to the
adviser was fair.39 On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the
court “erred in rejecting a „reasonableness‟ standard for
determining whether the [adviser] performed its „fiduciary
duty‟ in compliance with § 36(b).”40 The plaintiffs also argued
that the court erred in their analysis of the defendant‟s breach
of fiduciary duty by comparing the management fees of the
other money market funds.41
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court‟s judgment.42 The court held that, in order “[t]o be guilty
of a violation of § 36(b), . . . the adviser-manager must charge a
fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no
reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not
have been the product of arm‟s-length bargaining.”43 In
addition, the court set out six factors to consider when applying
the fiduciary duty standard under Section 36(b): “(a) the nature
and quality of services provided to fund shareholders; (b) the
profitability of the fund to the adviser-manager; (c) fallout
benefits: (d) economies of scale; (e) comparative fee structures;
and (f) the independence and conscientiousness of the
trustees.”44
B. Jones v. Harris Associates
Jones v. Harris Associates45 was the most recent mutual
fund fee case that came before the Supreme Court. Harris
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Johnson, supra note 10, at 158.
Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 925.
Id.
Id. at 925, 927.
Id. at 929.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 928.
Johnson, supra note 10, at 159.
527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) vacated, 130 S.Ct. 1418 (2010).
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Associates L.P. is an investment advisement company that
managed six open-ended funds collectively known as the
Oakmark complex of funds, which was based Chicago,
Illinois.46 The Oakmark board annually reselected Harris as its
investment adviser and, accordingly, determined Harris‟
compensation.47 In determining such compensation, the board
looked at various factors, including the services provided by
Harris, the fees charged to other clients of Harris, the fees of
other investment advisers charged to similar funds, and the
fund‟s performance.48
The plaintiffs owned shares in several of the funds.49 In
August 2004, three plaintiffs-investors brought derivative suits
on behalf of the mutual funds claiming that Harris was in
violation of its fiduciary duty under Section 36(b) of the
Investment Company Act. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged
that Harris charged Oakmark funds fees that far exceeded fees
charged to other clients for identical services.50 The District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois applied the
Gartenberg test and found that Harris‟ fees were not excessive
because they were similar to those charged to other mutual
funds.51 The court held that, in order for plaintiffs to sustain a
claim under Section 36(b), the plaintiff must show that the fees
“were so disproportionately large that they could not have been
the result of arm‟s-length bargaining.”52 Thus, Harris
Associates was not in violation of 36(b) because its fees were
“ordinary” and similar to those of other funds.53 Accordingly,
the court granted defendants summary judgment.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiffs disclaimed
the use of the Gartenberg standard.54 First, the plaintiffs
46. Id. at 629; Jones v. Harris Assocs., 2007 WL 627640, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 27, 2007).
47. Jones, 2007 WL 627640, at *1.
48. Id.
49. Jones, 527 F.3d at 629.
50. See Matthew Rinegar, Jones v. Harris Associates: Shareholder
Requirements for Proving a Mutual Fund Adviser’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty,
5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL‟Y SIDEBAR 45, 47 (2009).
51. Jones, 2007 WL 627640, at *7-8.
52. Id. at *7.
53. Id. at *8.
54. Jones, 527 F.3d at 632.
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argued that the standard relies too much on market prices,
which is “inappropriate because fees are set incestuously
rather than by competition.” The plaintiffs next argued that
instead, the “market for advisory services to unaffiliated
institutional clients” should be used as the benchmark of
reasonable fees.55 As the Seventh Circuit acknowledged, “[t]he
first argument stems from the fact investment advisers create
mutual funds, which they dominate notwithstanding the
statutory requirement that 40% of trustees be disinterested. . .
. The second argument rests on the fact that Harris Associates,
like many other investment advisers, has institutional clients
(such as pension funds) that pay less.”56 Accordingly, the
plaintiffs claimed that Harris Associates charges its mutual
fund shareholders significantly higher management fees than
its institutional clients.57 Fees for the Oakmark fund were 1
percent of the first two billion in assets, while independent
clients were charged about .5 percent of the first five hundred
million.58
Despite the plaintiffs‟ arguments, Judge Easterbrook of the
Seventh Circuit gave an opinion affirming the lower court‟s
judgment dismissing the claims against Harris Associates.
While Judge Easterbrook was also skeptical of Gartenberg, he
refused to use the approach for a very different reason, stating
“just as the plaintiffs are skeptical of Gartenberg because it
relies too heavily on markets, we are skeptical about
Gartenberg because it relies too little on markets.”59
The Seventh Circuit therefore established a new standard
under 36(b), holding that “[a] fiduciary must make full
disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on
compensation.”60 The court ultimately presumed that mutual
fund markets are efficient and that this market competition

55. Id. at 631.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. James F. Koehler & P. Wesley Lambert, The Supreme Court’s Review
of Jones v. Harris Associates and 36(b) Claims Under the Investment
Company Act of 1940—A Prospective and Analytical View, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J.
63, 69 (2009) (citing Jones, 527 F.3d at 631).
59. Jones, 527 F.3d at 632.
60. Id.
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would establish the adviser‟s compensation.61 The court further
qualified its interpretation of 36(b), indicating that “[i]t is
possible to imagine compensation so unusual that a court will
infer that deceit must have occurred, or that the persons
responsible for decision have abdicated . . . .”62
Chief Judge Easterbrook‟s majority opinion relies heavily
on the existence of a competitive market.63 Professor William
A. Birdthistle of Chicago‟s Kent Law School noted the
importance in Easterbrook‟s holding that “(a) the investment
industry is very competitive, (b) . . . in any well-functioning
industry, market competition keeps fees low, and (c) advisers
„can‟t make money‟ from its funds if „high fees drive investors
away.‟”64 Easterbrook emphasized the importance of disclosure,
asserting that “[f]ederal securities laws . . . work largely by
requiring disclosure and then allowing price to be set by
competition in which investors make their own choices.”65 In
addition, he “disregarded comparisons between institutional
investors and captive mutual funds because „no court would
inquire whether a salary normal among similar institutions is
excessive.‟”66
Judge Easterbrook ultimately took a neoclassical economic
approach to the case that depended on the notion that market
forces will constrain advisory fees.67 The court essentially found
that “many sophisticated investors in hedge funds pay
disproportionately high fees, and therefore, high fees alone are
insufficient to support a fiduciary duty claim under the
statute.”68 Thus, despite the incestuous relationship between
mutual funds and their advisors, Easterbrook argued that
investors still had the option to move their money elsewhere if
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral
Approach Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 91 (2010).
64. William Birdthistle, Chief Judge Easterbrook & Classical Law &
Economics,
THE
CONGLOMERATE
BLOG
(Mar.
11,
2009),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/03/chief-judge-easterbrook-andclassical-law-economics.html.
65. Jones, 527 F.3d at 635.
66. Johnson, supra note 10, at 162.
67. Birdthistle, supra note 63, at 88-89.
68. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 72.
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they found a mutual fund‟s fees to be too excessive.
On August 8, 2008, Judge Richard A. Posner filed a dissent
to the Seventh Circuit‟s decision to deny a rehearing of the
case.69 His dissent disagreed with the Seventh Circuit‟s
disapproval of the Gartenberg standard and highlighted the
fact that Jones was the only case that disclaimed the Second
Circuit opinion.70 Posner emphasized that the majority‟s
market forces approach was inappropriate and based upon “an
economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination on the basis of
growing indications that executive compensation in large
publicly traded firms often is excessive because of the feeble
incentives of boards of directors to police compensation.”71
Posner criticized Easterbrook‟s reliance on market
competition, arguing that “[m]utual funds are a component of
the financial services industry, where abuses have been
rampant . . . .”72 Posner focused primarily on the disparity in
advisory fees charged by mutual funds and those charged by
institutional investors where captive mutual funds are charged
more than twice that of institutional funds.73 Posner addressed
the problem of the absence of arm‟s-length bargaining in the
mutual fund context.
Posner‟s dissent illustrated the modification of Gartenberg,
or the Gartenberg-plus standard. He argued that there cannot
be arm‟s-length negotiation when only comparing mutual fund
fees among similar funds.74 Rather, different fees should be
examined in comparison to both mutual funds and institutional
funds.75 This, Posner argued, is the only way arm‟s-length
negotiation would occur.76 “Because „the usual arm‟s length
bargaining between strangers does not occur between an
adviser and the fund,‟ the judicial task is to find a proxy for
what arm‟s length bargaining might have produced.”77 The
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Jones, 537 F.3d 728 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id. at 729.
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Greabe et al., supra note 15, at 161 (footnote omitted).
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arm‟s-length transactions used by institutional investors “can
and should be used as reliable benchmarks when judging the
unfairness of prices set by a fund adviser for portfolio
management services rendered to a captive fund.”78
Judge Posner argued that this factor should include a
comparison of the fees charged to mutual funds and those
charged to institutional clients.79 Essentially, “advisors should
be able to pass the additional variable costs of administering a
retail fund over an institutional fund to retail clients, but a
management fee in excess of the additional administrative
costs should strongly indicate investment advisors have
breached their fiduciary duties.”80 Thus, the Posner standard
acknowledges the unique nature of mutual funds and
ultimately allows for increased shareholder protection from
excessive fees as Congress intended in promulgating the 1940
Investment Company Act.
V. The Supreme Court Decision
On March 9, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear the case. The issue before the Court was what standard to
apply when reviewing a claim of an investment adviser‟s
excessive fee under 36(b) of the Investment Company Act.
Particularly, the Court examined whether the Seventh Circuit
contravened the Investment Company Act in holding that a
shareholder‟s claim that the fund‟s investment adviser charged
an excessive fee is not cognizable under 36(b).81
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the majority opinion
of the Court and upheld the longstanding approach set forth in
Gartenberg:
[W]e conclude that Gartenberg was correct in its
basic formulation of what § 36(b) requires: to face
liability under § 36(b), an investment adviser
must charge a fee that is so disproportionately
78.
79.
80.
81.

Freeman et al., supra note 2, at 141.
Johnson, supra note 10, at 174.
Id. at 174-75 (footnote omitted).
Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/8

12

2011]

SHAREHOLDERS’ CONSOLATION PRIZE

783

large that it bears no reasonable relationship to
the services rendered and could not have been
the product of arm‟s length bargaining.82
Justice Alito engaged in a systematic analysis of 36(b) and
addressed the issue of “what a mutual fund shareholder must
prove in order to show that a mutual fund investment adviser
breached the „fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of
compensation for services‟ that is imposed by § 36(b) of the
[Act] . . . .”83
Justice Alito engaged in a defense of the Gartenberg
standard, indicating that the veteran approach “fully
incorporates [the] understanding of the fiduciary duty as set
out in Pepper and reflects § 36(b)(1)‟s imposition of the burden
on the plaintiff.”84 Justice Alito also emphasized the standard‟s
relationship to the protections provided by the Investment
Company Act. In particular, the Court highlighted the
importance of the Act‟s role in providing checks and balances
on excessive fees. The Act focuses on “disinterested directors as
„independent watchdogs‟ of the relationship between a mutual
fund and its adviser.”85 In turn, the Act requires advisers to
provide directors with all the information “reasonably . . .
necessary”86 to determine whether an adviser‟s compensation is
excessive. The Court then emphasized that Gartenberg
encompasses the importance of providing some measure of
deference to a board‟s judgment and that such measures of
deference may vary depending on the circumstances.87
The Court next addressed the hot-button issue of
comparing fees charged by an adviser to a captive mutual fund
and those charged to its independent or institutional investors.
In Gartenberg, the Second Circuit rejected a comparison of the
fees the adviser charged a money market fund and those

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426 (2010).
Id. at 1422.
Id. at 1427.
Id.
15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(c) (West 2010).
Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1421.
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charged to a pension fund.88 Justice Alito again took no sides
and instead indicated that “courts must give comparisons . . .
the weight they merit in light of the similarities and differences
between the services that clients in question require . . . the
court must be wary of inapt comparisons.”89 The Court also
noted that courts should not rely too heavily on the fees
charged by other advisers to mutual funds because they may
not be the product of arm‟s length negotiations.90
Finally, Justice Alito noted how courts should evaluate an
investment adviser‟s fiduciary duty. Courts should afford
deference to the outcome of board‟s bargaining process when
such process involves a “robust” review of investment-adviser
compensation.91 “Thus, if the disinterested directors considered
the relevant factors, their decision to approve a particular fee
agreement is entitled to considerable weight, even if a court
might weigh the factors differently.”92 On the other hand, the
board‟s decision should be subject to more rigorous scrutiny if
its negotiation and review process was “deficient” because an
adviser‟s failure “to disclose material information to the board .
. . might have hampered the board‟s ability to function as „an
independent check upon the management.‟”93 While courts may
engage in this evaluation of a board‟s decision regarding
adviser compensation, Justice Alito warned against “judicial
second-guessing” as part of determining a 36(b) fiduciary
breach.94 “In reviewing compensation under § 36(b), the Act
does not require courts to engage in a precise calculation of fees
representative of arm‟s-length bargaining.”95
While the Court noted the Seventh Circuit‟s error in
focusing on disclosure, it left the debate between Judge
Easterbrook and Judge Posner to Congress.96 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Thomas declined to characterize the majority
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1426 (citing Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930, n.3).
Id. at 1421.
Id.
Id. at 1429.
Id.
Id. at 1430 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1430.
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opinion as an affirmation of the Gartenberg standard.97 Rather,
Justice Thomas assured that Gartenberg should not be read to
“countenance the free-ranging judicial „fairness‟ review of fees
that Gartenberg could be read to authorize.”98 The Court
vacated the Seventh Circuit decision and remanded the case for
proceedings consistent with its opinion.99
VI. Debriefing the Supreme Court Decision
A. The Consequences of Reaffirming Gartenberg
In the great debate between Judge Easterbrook and Judge
Posner, Justice Alito took no sides, but rather maintained the
status quo in upholding the Gartenberg standard. Considering
the heated Easterbrook-Posner conflict over the disclosure and
comparative fee structures, Justice Alito‟s interpretation of
36(b) focuses more on the “watchdog” role of disinterested
directors and the need for advisors to provide a board with the
reasonable information necessary to determine whether an
adviser‟s fee is excessive. This is significant, considering the
impact the decision could and will have on mutual fund adviser
compensation. As one scholar rightly predicted prior to the
March 2010 decision, the Supreme Court‟s decision in Jones
ultimately turned on whether the Court believed that courts
should be determining the reasonableness of investment
adviser fees.100 In affirming Gartenberg, the Supreme Court
took the position of maintaining the status quo of allowing
courts to have some say in determining reasonable
compensation, while also giving deference to the business
judgment of mutual fund boards.
This decision is problematic for critics of the Gartenberg
approach, and for plaintiff investors who have never won a suit
under the standard. Gartenberg has been, for the last thirty
years, the judicial standard for the determination of excessive
fees under 36(b). However, a clear flaw in the Gartenberg
97. Id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. Id. (majority opinion).
100. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 80.
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standard has surfaced in light of Justice Posner‟s dissent.
While Gartenberg acknowledged that the standard for testing
the reasonableness of a fiduciary‟s compensation in a selfdealing transaction is an arm‟s length price,101 it failed to
specify from which marketplace the comparable market prices
are to be extracted. As a result, Gartenberg allows funds to
defend their fees by comparing them to fees paid by other
mutual funds. This comparison would be reasonable if advisers
competed with one another to service mutual funds, but as
discussed above, the relationship between a mutual fund and
its adviser does not allow for such competition to exist. As
Judge Posner pointed out in his dissent, “[t]he governance
structure that enables mutual fund advisers to charge
exorbitant fees is industry-wide, so the panel‟s comparability
approach would if widely followed allow those fees to become
the industry‟s floor.”102
Many scholars have also criticized the Gartenberg
standard for its failure to provide meaningful shareholder
protection.103 The fact that no one has ever prevailed on a 36(b)
claim suggests that most funds which have been sued maintain
fees roughly proportionate to their competition.104 In addition,
Gartenberg’s “so disproportionately large” language has been
criticized as vague and contrary to the conception of fiduciary
duty.105 The language has enabled advisers to argue
successfully that the 36(b) duty is narrow. The language also
suggests that “relief is unavailable under § 36(b) unless a court
is convinced as a substantive economic matter that a
challenged fee is simply too high, without regard to either the
fairness of the fee-setting process or the rates negotiated at
arm‟s length by non-mutual fund clients of the adviser.”106
While it seems that Justice Alito simply maintained the
status quo, perhaps Justice Thomas was right in clarifying that
101. Freeman et al., supra note 2, at 140.
102. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Posner, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded by 130 S. Ct. 1418, 176 L. Ed.
2d 265 (2010).
103. Johnson, supra note 10, at 166.
104. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 88.
105. Greabe et al., supra note 15, at 157.
106. Id.
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the Court‟s decision was not an affirmation of the Gartenberg
standard, but rather a clarification for future interpretations of
Gartenberg. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote
that he “would not shortchange the Court‟s effort by describing
it as affirmation of the „Gartenberg standard.‟”107 Rather,
Justice Thomas warned against the way that the district court
and court of appeals emphasized “fee „fairness‟ and
proportionality . . . in a manner that could be read to permit
the equivalent of the judicial rate regulation the Gartenberg
opinions disclaim.”108 In other words, courts must be wary of
interpreting Gartenberg in a way that allows the judiciary to
engage in actual rate regulation. This position that courts
should not be too involved in determining compensation could
explain the Supreme Court‟s decision not to modify Gartenberg.
B. Overturning Judge Easterbrook and the Seventh Circuit
The Supreme Court was very forceful in its rejection of
Judge Easterbrook‟s disclosure-focused interpretation and his
denunciation of the Gartenberg standard. Since the decision
came out in 2007, Judge Easterbrook‟s market forces approach
has faced a mountain of criticism. Among the biggest
disagreements with the Seventh Circuit approach is its
improper reliance on competition, its interpretation of the 36(b)
statute contrary its language and purpose, and the
establishment of a standard focusing only on disclosure. Justice
Alito clearly stated that “[b]y focusing almost entirely on the
element of disclosure, the Seventh Circuit panel erred.”109 In
defense of Gartenberg, Justice Alito further stated that while
the standard “which the panel rejected, may lack sharp
analytical clarity . . . we believe that it accurately reflects the
compromise that is embodied in § 36(b), and it has provided a
workable standard for nearly three decades.”110

107. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1431 (2010) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
108. Id.
109. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) vacated,
130 S.Ct. 1418 (2010).
110. Id.
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In relying on a competitive market, Easterbrook‟s standard
failed to even consider and take into account arm‟s length
bargaining. “The court‟s decision ultimately put its faith in the
presumed sophistication of individual investors to keep
investment adviser fees competitive by shopping around for
mutual funds with lower fees.”111 Judge Easterbrook, however,
ignored the context of mutual funds and the fact that they are
“often composed of interested parties, semi-interested parties,
or advisers of other mutual funds, resulting in a truly „captive‟
board more interested in creating profits for the adviser than
the fund.”112
Judge Easterbrook argued only that 36(b) requires
disclosure, that there be no fraud, and acknowledges that
compensation could be “so unusual” that a court would infer
deceit.113 Judge Easterbrook looked to the law of trusts114 in
articulating a new standard for 36(b) that “[a] fiduciary duty
must make full disclosure and play no tricks . . . .”115 While it is
a crucial part of satisfying a fiduciary duty, disclosure alone
would not protect fund shareholders from excessive fees.
Furthermore, Judge Easterbrook‟s standard essentially
ignored the language and purpose of 36(b).116 Judge
Easterbrook‟s conclusion that 36(b) merely required that “[a]
fiduciary must make full disclosure and play no tricks”
eliminates the substance from the fiduciary duty.117 Professor
William A. Birdthistle argues that “[t]he specificity of the
phrase „with respect to the receipt of compensation for services‟
strongly suggests that Section 36(b) created a new kind of
fiduciary duty beyond the simple avoidance of defrauding an
investor, as Easterbrook suggested.”118 Indeed, the language of
36(b) itself “provides that the board‟s approval „shall be given
such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under
111. Rinegar, supra note 50, at 52.
112. Id.
113. Johnson, supra note 10, at 167.
114. Birdthistle, supra note 63, at 90.
115. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) vacated,
130 S.Ct. 1418 (2010).
116. Johnson, supra note 10, at 168.
117. Birdthistle, supra note 63, at 90.
118. Id. at 99.
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all circumstances.‟”119 This language implies a more thorough
test regarding the excessiveness of fees, rather than Judge
Easterbrook‟s narrow and deferential standard.120
C. The Supreme Court’s Consideration of Gallus
In a decision that came out just months after Jones, the
Eighth Circuit, in John E. Gallus v. Ameriprise Financial,121
adopted and added to Posner‟s standard. The facts in Gallus
are very similar to those in the Jones case. The plaintiffs were
shareholders of eleven mutual funds that were advised by
Ameriprise.122 The plaintiffs asserted that Ameriprise breached
its fiduciary duty under 36(b) for misleading the fund board
during negotiations and demanding excessive fees.123 The
Eighth Circuit held that the district court erred in holding that
no 36(b) violation occurred simply because the defendant‟s fee
passed muster under the standard in Gartenberg.124
The Eighth Circuit focused primarily on the discrepancy
between fees charged to institutional investors and those
charged to mutual funds.125 The court ultimately adopted a test
that combines the Gartenberg factors and Judge Posner‟s
standard. “The court found that a proper evaluation of § 36(b)
should include a comparison between fees charged to
institutional clients and mutual fund clients.”126 Furthermore,
the Eighth Circuit indicated that “the proper approach to 36(b)
is one that looks to both the adviser‟s conduct during
negotiation and the end result.”127
The Supreme Court appeared to consider the Eighth
119. Rinegar, supra note 50, at 52.
120. Id.
121. 561 F.3d 816, 822-23 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2340
(2010).
122. Id. at 818.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 823.
125. The plaintiffs presented evidence indicating that the fees charged
by the adviser to retail mutual funds were nearly double those charged to
institutional investors. Id. at 819.
126. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 75 (footnote omitted).
127. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 822-23 (8th Cir.
2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010).
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Circuit‟s approach to look “to both the adviser‟s conduct during
negotiation and the end result.”128 Additional evidence of
irregularities in the negotiation process should be relevant to
the inquiry.129 While the size of the fee itself is an important
factor to consider, this factor “should not be construed to create
a safe harbor of exorbitance.”130 The Eighth Circuit read the
plain language of 36(b) to impose a duty of honesty and
transparency on advisers during the negotiation process.131 The
justification for the inclusion of such evidence is found within
other statutory and regulatory requirements of the Investment
Company Act:
Section 10(a) of the ICA requires that at least
40% of a fund‟s board of directors not be
“interested persons” with regard to the adviser.
Furthermore, Section 15(c) of the ICA requires
that advisory fee agreements be approved by a
majority vote of the disinterested directors cast
in person at a special meeting “called for the
purpose of voting on such approval” after the
disinterested directors have been provided “such
information as may reasonably be necessary to
evaluate the terms of any contract.” Advisory
agreements that the adviser knows to have been
made in violation of these structural
requirements are void and subject to rescission
under § 47(b) of the ICA.132
“Thus, a court entering a Section 36(b) claim may
determine that a fee has been unlawfully received under
Section 36(b) if it finds, as a threshold matter, that the adviser
knows that the fee was not approved following deliberations by
a disinterested board acting independently.”133 This was an

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
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issue in Jones, where the adviser knew that the fee was
approved by a conflicted board with a director who turned out
to be interested, rather than disinterested. The Seventh Circuit
dismissed evidence of the director‟s interested status. With the
inclusion of evidence that occurred during negotiations, courts
may determine that any “unscrupulous behavior” by an advisor
during and after negotiations is a breach of that adviser‟s
fiduciary duty under 36(b).134
Thus, the Supreme Court‟s consideration of the Eighth
Circuit‟s look at adviser conduct could place more scrutiny on
mutual fund boards and their determination of reasonable
adviser compensation.135 Emphasizing the watchdog role of
disinterested directors, Justice Alito declared that “[u]nder the
Act, scrutiny of investment adviser compensation by a fully
informed mutual fund board is the „cornerstone of the . . . effort
to control conflicts of interest within mutual funds.”136 Justice
Alito essentially stated that courts should afford fund boards
deference when they have considered all the relevant factors in
determining adviser compensation, but greater scrutiny is
justified with evidence of some interference with a fund board‟s
decision, such as an adviser‟s failure to disclose important
information regarding compensation.137 Thus, it seems that the
Court clarified the Gartenberg interpretation of the 36(b)
standard to emphasize both a board and adviser‟s ability to
defend their fees determination.
D. Critiquing the Supreme Court’s Ruling
Prior to the Supreme Court decision, two scholars provided
an interesting observation:
To predict the outcome, one must ask why the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in the

134. See Gallus, 561 F.3d at 823.
135. Jessica Toonkel Marquez, High Court Ruling Opens Door for More
Lawsuits Over Mutual Fund Fees, INVESTMENT NEWS, Apr. 4, 2010,
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100404/REG/304049991.
136. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1427.
137. Id. at 1427-28.
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first place. No one has prevailed on a § 36(b)
claim under the Gartenberg standard. The
Seventh Circuit opinion lays down an even more
arduous standard . . . . Perhaps the Supreme
Court, as a sign of the times, feels compelled to
set a standard plaintiffs can meet.138
While the Supreme Court may not necessarily have felt
compelled to set an easier standard for plaintiffs, Justice Alito
spent time explaining the Court‟s limited role in the
determination of a fund adviser‟s excessive compensation.
Justice Alito focused heavily on the fact that courts do not have
rate-setting responsibilities.139 “In reviewing compensation
under § 36(b), the Act does not require courts to engage in a
precise calculation of fees representative of arm‟s-length
bargaining.”140 Furthermore, courts should not interfere with
the business judgment and discretion of fund boards. Even
conflicts of interest that may call for some restraints on board
discretion do “not suggest that a court may supplant the
judgment of disinterested directors apprised of all relevant
information . . . .”141
Despite Justice Alito‟s reflection of “congressional choice „to
rely largely upon [independent director] „watchdogs‟ to protect
shareholders interests,‟”142 this Note argues that the Supreme
Court should have adopted a more shareholder-friendly
standard such as that advocated by Gallus and others as the
proper determination of the 36(b) fiduciary duty standard. On
appeal of Gallus, the Supreme Court reached a decision on
April 5, 2010 to vacate the judgment and remand the case to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
light of the Supreme Court‟s decision in Jones.143 This decision
raises questions as to the impact the Court‟s decision will have
on the Gallus plaintiffs, and more importantly, for future

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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plaintiff investors. The Court‟s affirmation of Gartenberg is
essentially an affirmation of the plaintiffs‟ loss for advocates of
a more proactive judicial stance on compensation that
emphasizes the importance of the institutional and mutual
fund fee comparison.
Thus, this Note asserts that the Supreme Court should
have strongly considered the Gallus standard‟s emphasis on
both the importance of disclosure as well as the inclusion of
Posner‟s comparative fee structure. Justice Alito placed little
weight on the debate over the comparative fee structure. The
Court explained that “[e]ven if the services provided and fees
charged to an independent fund are relevant, courts should be
mindful that the Act does not necessarily ensure fee parity
between mutual funds and institutional clients . . . .”144 While
the Act may not provide for assurances of fee parity, the Jones
petitioners‟ argument for comparison of fees charged to
institutional investors and those charged to mutual funds is
certainly a valid one. In fact, the SEC also took this position in
its amicus brief for the petitioners and relied on trust law.145
The SEC urged the Court to interpret the 36(b) fiduciary duty
in accordance with trust law and provided evidence from its
own study, which concluded that “board and shareholder
approval could not protect shareholder interests with respect to
advisory compensation because mutual funds could not, as a
practical matter, terminate their relationship with advisers.”146
Thus, in order to simulate arm‟s-length bargaining, courts
should be able to engage in a comparison of fees charged to
mutual funds with those charged to institutional investors,
which does involve the arm‟s length bargaining of contracts.
While Justice Alito was merited in criticizing the Seventh
Circuit‟s dominant focus on disclosure, the element of
disclosure still warrants stronger consideration than that
provided by the Court. The incorporation of disclosure into the
interpretation of the fiduciary duty includes the importance of
the comparative fee structure as a remedy to the arm‟s length
bargaining concern in the mutual fund context. The Jones
144. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1429 (2010).
145. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 76-77.
146. Id. at 76.
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petitioners argued that the fiduciary duty under 36(b) should
consist of “an obligation to disclose „all material facts relating
to‟ compensation and an obligation that the compensation they
receive be fair and negotiated for „in an arm‟s-length
transaction.‟”147
In particular, the petitioners stated that Congress‟ use of
the term “fiduciary duty” in 36(b) should be interpreted with its
common law meaning.148 Petitioners looked to the Supreme
Court‟s rule of construction in Neder v. United States, which
states that “„[w]here Congress uses terms that have
accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of
these terms.‟”149 The common law meaning of a fiduciary duty
includes the accurate disclosure of all material facts to a
beneficiary, as well as a fair transaction.150 Thus, petitioners
argue that, because Congress has not unequivocally expressed
a contrary intent to the traditional definition to fiduciary duty,
the Court should interpret the 36(b) fiduciary duty in
accordance with its common law meaning. The petitioners also
point out that the common law interpretation of fiduciary duty
is in line with Congress‟ intent to include such a duty within
36(b):
[The Supreme Court‟s cases] and the legislative
history recognize Congress‟s understanding that
arm‟s-length bargaining was absent from the
usual captive mutual-fund structure and that
investment advisers were obtaining economies of
scale that should be shared with fund
shareholders. The history further demonstrates

147. Rinegar, supra note 50, at 53.
148. Brief for Petitioners, Jones, 130 S.Ct. 1418 (No. 08- 586), 2009 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 451, at *10-11, *38-39; see also Rinegar, supra note 50, at
53 (discussing Petitioners‟assertion that “§ 36(b) uses the term „fiduciary
duty,‟ a term which had a „set‟ common law meaning”).
149. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 3 (1999) (quoting Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992)).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. g (2007).
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that Congress‟s purpose in enacting § 36(b) was
to replace the unduly restrictive corporate waste
standard for challenging adviser fees with a more
effective standard anchored in familiar principles
of fiduciary-duty law.151
While Justice Alito addressed this issue in his opinion and
settled the dispute between petitioners and respondents
regarding the meaning of “fiduciary duty” under 36(b),152 he
found it “unnecessary to take sides in this dispute,”153 and
merely reemphasized the Court‟s decision in Pepper v. Litton.154
As stated above, petitioners argued that the meaning derives
from trust law; respondents disagreed contending “that the
term „fiduciary‟ is not exclusive to the law of trusts” and that
the term means different things in various contexts.155 Pepper
illustrates the burden and “rigorous scrutiny” imposed on
directors “not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but
also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the
corporation . . . . The essence of the test is whether or not under
all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of
an arm‟s length bargain.”156 According to Justice Alito, this was
the meaning of the 36(b) fiduciary duty. He argued that the
Investment Company Act modified this duty by shifting “the
burden of proof from the fiduciary to the party claiming breach,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1), to show that the fee is outside the
range that arm‟s-length bargaining would produce.”157 While
this may be true, petitioner‟s argument for the use of the
common law meaning of fiduciary duty, and therefore the
inclusion of disclosure as part of that duty under 36(b), should
have been given more weight to allow for more adequate
shareholder protections against excessive fees.
Petitioner‟s argument for the common law interpretation of
151. Brief for Petitioners, Jones, 130 S.Ct. 1418 (No. 08- 586) (June 10,
2009), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 451, at *28-29.
152. Jones, 130 S.Ct. at 1427.
153. Id.
154. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1427 (citing Litton, 308 U.S. at 306-07) (emphasis omitted).
157. Id.
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36(b) would constitute an expansion of the current Gartenberg
standard because it would incorporate “more evidence into the
analysis of objective fairness and also incorporates other
procedural requirements of the [Investment Company Act] into
the private action.”158 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit‟s
interpretation of the 36(b) standard constituted, as petitioners
contend, a misstatement of an adviser‟s duty. The fiduciary
duty of disclosure requires more than just the avoidance of
playing tricks and committing fraudulent behavior.159 Rather,
it involves the disclosure of all material facts.160
Furthermore, 33(b) of the Investment Company Act
provides obligations for advisers to comply with filing and
disclosure requirements and makes unlawful the omission of
“any fact necessary in order to prevent the statements made
therein . . . from being materially misleading.”161 The purpose
of these disclosure requirements is to help the market function
rationally, since the disclosure of fees and potential conflicts of
interest benefit those who purchase shares and pay attention
to management fees.162 The disclosure of fees was an issue in
Jones “where the adviser failed to make required disclosures
either of the deferred compensation agreement with its formerexecutive-turned-disinterested-director or the joint investments
between fund directors and certain of the adviser‟s executive
and employees.”163
The requirement of disclosure and the comparative fee
structure would ultimately facilitate the enforcement of 36(b).
“In practice, for boards to compare their mutual fund‟s fee to
the investment adviser‟s institutional clients‟ fees, the adviser
would have to disclose clearly delineated fees, and report fees
and
expenses
independently
from
one
another.”164
Furthermore, any discrepancy between the fees charged to

158. Rinegar, supra note 50, at 53.
159. Jones, 130 S.Ct. at 1424.
160. Brief for Petitioners, Jones, 130 S.Ct. 1418 (No. 08- 586) (June 10,
2009), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 451,*21.
161. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-33(b) (West 2010).
162. Greabe et al., supra note 15, at 161.
163. Id. at 161-62.
164. Emily D. Johnson, The Fiduciary Duty in Mutual Fund Excessive
Fee Cases: Ripe for Reexamination, 59 DUKE L.J. 145, 177-78 (2009).
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retail investors and those charged to institutional investors
should indicate breach. Thus, boards would have to require
funds to justify an excessive cost, otherwise “they would be
shirking their responsibilities to shareholders.165 36(b) does not
give the board‟s decision conclusive weight, except only as such
consideration is appropriate in all circumstances.166 “[E]vidence
a fund adviser or one of its affiliates treats an outsider more
favorably than the very party to whom the adviser owes
statutorily-provided fiduciary duties needs to be recognized for
what it is: prima facie evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty.”167
Requiring full disclosure of fees as well as the comparison of
institutional and retail investors would ensure more protection
to shareholders.
VII.

Conclusion

As the Eighth Circuit states, “[t]he Gartenberg case
demonstrates one way in which a fund adviser can breach its
fiduciary duty; but it is not the only way.”168 Indeed, the
Supreme Court clarified yet another interpretation of the
Gartenberg standard, highlighting its reflection of the true
meaning of the Section 36(b) fiduciary duty:
[T]he expertise of the independent trustees of a
fund, whether they are fully informed about all
facts bearing on the [investment adviser‟s]
service and fee, and the extent of care and
conscientiousness with which they perform their
duties are important factors to be considered in
deciding whether they and the [investment
adviser] are guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty
in violation of § 36(b).169
In focusing more on the role of disinterested directors, the
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Johnson, supra note 10.
Id.
Freeman et al., supra note 2.
Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d at 823.
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 2010 WL 1189560, at *9.
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Supreme Court decision may appear to place more pressure on
mutual fund boards and advisers to provide reasonable fees. In
fact, the Supreme Court‟s rejection of the Seventh Circuit‟s
disclosure-only approach could signify a win for shareholders
and perhaps lead to more mutual fund fee lawsuits.170
It seems more likely, however, that Justice Alito‟s decision
to affirm the Gartenberg standard only maintains the status
quo for plaintiff investors. While the Court‟s decision provides
plaintiffs with the hope of winning lawsuits, it does not
necessarily put them in a better position to win. Justice Alito
ultimately ignored the significance of the comparative fee issue
and whether a fund board‟s negotiation process involves arm‟s
length bargaining at all. In balancing the importance of
granting deference to mutual fund boards and advisers with
the dangers of judicial rate-setting, perhaps Justice Alito was
correct in keeping courts in their place and leaving the issues
surrounding today‟s mutual fund market to Congress.
However, the Supreme Court could and should have done more
in the way of protection of shareholders.

170. Marquez, supra note 135.
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